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Book Reviews
WAR LAW UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
ARMED CONFLICT BY MICHAEL BYERS (VANCOUVER:
DOUGLAS & MCINTYRE, 2005) 214 pages.'
BY JILLIAN M. SISKIND
2
Michael Byers' new book on the laws of war is an excellent guide
for any layperson interested in this topic. He provides a thorough, yet
simple, explanation of how decisions are made in the context of war and
military intervention at both the national and international levels. Byers
examines the technical aspects of the laws that govern nations and
combatants in the conduct of war. In the context of UN Security Council
operations, the author discusses the reality of how the law operates in
practice and how it has been applied in past conflicts.
Byers presents War Law in a logical manner, beginning with an
explanation of the role of the United Nations and the significance of
having the Security Council's authorization for military intervention.
These early chapters provide excellent examples of how the Security
Council's authorization or non-authorization for military intervention
has played out in reality. A picture emerges of how, despite its
limitations, the Security Council furthered the progress and evolution of
international law in some cases and hindered it in others. An example of
the former can be seen in the Security Council's de facto expansion of
the concept of "threats to international peace and security, 3 to include
international humanitarian crises. For instance, the Security Council
used its authority under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to create safe
havens for Bosnian civilians affected by the 1990s conflict in Bosnia and
Herzegovina.
Any discussion of military intervention . in recent history
necessarily requires a discussion of the role of the United States, the
global hegemon-its military decisions and its tactics. Byers takes a
political approach to this highly controversial discussion. The
W[ ar Law].
2 LL.M., Ph.D. candidate (Osgoode Hall Law School), Senior Advisor for public safety and
security issues for Ontario's Solicitor General. The author would like to thank Heidi Rubin and
Cecilia Parker for their insightful input.
3 Supra note 1 at 25.
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introduction explains that much of the book focuses on the United
States because, relatively speaking, it is militarily more powerful than
any political entity since the Roman Empire. Interestingly, the early
chapters tend to be fairly objective in their discussion of U.S.
intervention in foreign countries: Byers focuses on the facts without
excessive commentary. However, in the final chapters, Byers is
increasingly critical of U.S. foreign policy. Like much of the commentary
in humanitarian law literature, Byers is highly critical of the "Bush
doctrine," which emphasizes pre-emptive military action in the face of
potential danger. His concern follows from his belief that this approach
may induce other countries to obtain weapons of mass destruction and
may give all countries permission to use full force in the face of
potential threats. This criticism becomes much more pronounced and
political as the book reaches its conclusion. Byers uses a critique of
American foreign policy as a means of explaining how international
humanitarian law should operate in a perfectly lawful world. Despite the
political rhetoric, this method is very effective in illustrating the
realpolitik framework within which the law of war exists.
Byers' use of examples to illustrate how the law has. evolved-
starting with the Korean war, including the conflicts in Southern
Rhodesia, Iraq, the former Yugoslavia, Haiti, East Timor, and ending
with the worsening situation in Darfur, Sudan-is very effective.
Through the use of these examples, Byers provides an excellent
explanation of the intricate conflicts and the complexities involved in the
Security Council's authorization of the use of force. Following this
analysis, Byers poignantly observes that the "Security Council remains a
political body that cannot itself be forced to act. Frequently it will not
take action even when, as in the case of Darfur, the moral case is
overwhelming."
4
The early chapters of the book also cover the concept of "self-
defence" and necessarily begin with the initial event that articulated the
test for the conditions to invoke this inherent right: the Caroline
incident. It was this incident, which occurred during the war of 1812
between the United Kingdom and the United States, that led to "self-
defence" being lawful when there is "instant necessity leaving no choice
4 Ibid. at 39.
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of means and no moment of deliberation."5 The discussion then turns to
the codification of this right in the UN Charter. In the early chapters,
Byers explains that international lawyers tend to use the positivist
approach to law, according to which each legal problem has a correct
answer. In the context of self-defence, however, he suggests that a legal
claim to self-defence will depend on the facts of each case and thus
requires a greater degree of flexibility than the positivist approach
offers.
Using a recent and highly contentious example of self-defence,
Byers explains that there is no clear support for self-defence actions
taken against countries implicated in acts of terrorism. This is
particularly so, he explains, in situations that do not meet the
requirements of necessity and proportionality. It is at this point that the
criticism of U.S. foreign policy begins in earnest. Byers comments on
how the U.S. government actively attempts to change any law that
stands in its way and yet has failed to convince others of its need for a
pre-emptive strategy of self-defence. Interestingly, he observes that as a
result of these strategies used by the United States, and the heightened
concern about terrorism generally, the right to self-defence now
includes military responses against countries willingly harbouring or
supporting terrorists. This conclusion is, however, premature and overly
simplistic. This area of the law is still emerging and there is clearly no
custom on how to treat states that harbour or support terrorists.
Similarly, there is no consensus on whether there should be a difference
in treatment for states having differing degrees of complicity with
terrorist groups.
The next section deals with humanitarian intervention, which is
a very recent-and still uncertain-development in international law. As
Byers aptly explains, there are no credible precedents, no state practices,
no opinio juris, and therefore, no customary international law that
supports this practice. Unless expressly authorized by the UN Security
Council, humanitarian intervention is illegal; it is, however, often widely
supported and demanded in the political arena. Byers cites a number. of
examples of humanitarian intervention, which include India's
intervention in East Pakistan in 1971, Vietnam's intervention in
Cambodia in 1978, Tanzania's intervention in Uganda in 1979, and the
- Ibid. at 54.
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intervention in Northern Iraq by Britain, France, Italy, the Netherlands
and the United States in 1991. Byers notes that with the exception of
Britain in 1991, none of the intervening countries advanced an argument
of humanitarian intervention and thus there is no opinio juris on this
practice. This observation, however, tells only part of the story. The
interventions referred to occurred on humanitarian grounds, and though
the phrase "humanitarian intervention" was not used, each was arguably
based on humanitarian reasons. Thus, opinio juris may well be slowly
evolving to include humanitarian intervention in certain circumstances.
Still, this type of intervention has not become a part of customary
international law and remains highly controversial.
Inspired by the need to address the legality of humanitarian
intervention in international law, Canada established an independent
body to study this problem. The working group concluded that although
the UN Charter's strong bias against military intervention is not
absolute, it would be difficult, as a political matter, to reach a consensus
on when intervention is justified. Byers urges an emphasis on the duty to
prevent, rather than the duty to protect: intervention, then, should only
be undertaken in the most extreme situations. Prevention could be
achieved, he argues, by directing military budgets to foreign aid and
development.
The final section focuses on international law during armed
conflict. Byers provides a good, basic explanation of the significance of
the Geneva and Hague conventions as the bases for the laws of war. He
also describes how the protection of civilians plays a central role in
international humanitarian law. Byers makes an interesting criticism of
U.S. foreign policy: since war technology has resulted in the deaths of
fewer soldiers, the United States has been able to resort to war as a way
to deflect attention from internal political problems, scandals, and
economic decline. This practice, he argues, has the effect of a more
cavalier approach to the jus ad bellum, or justification for war; a good
example is the "Bush doctrine" of pre-emptive self-defence.
Byers' anti-Bush sentiments are most pronounced in the final
chapter on war crimes courts and tribunals. This chapter includes a
description of the Iraqi Special Court and the trial of deposed Iraqi
president, Saddam Hussein. Byers notes that this is a highly political
trial, as the court is primarily staffed by American lawyers, and the trial
was perfectly timed to coincide with the U.S. elections. The media was
provided with only limited and controlled access to the proceedings. By
contrast, Byers lauds the legitimacy of the International Criminal
[VOL. 44, NO. 4
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Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia's (ICTY) trial of Slobodan Milosevic.
In support of this position, he refers to the Chapter VII mandate of.the
tribunal from the Security Council, which necessarily required the votes
of China and Russia. He argues that vindicating the victor is not the
purpose of the tribunal's trial. In making that claim, Byers ignores the
fact that the United States and other NATO countries are the main
funders of the ICTY, and that no NATO leaders were ever indicted for
bombings in Kosovo that severely affected civilians and thus may have
violated the laws and customs of war.
Byers criticizes the Hussein trial and argues that the trial further
endangers legitimacy in the fledgling international legal system, but his
distinction between the ICTY and the Iraqi Special Court is tenuous.
Both institutions reinforce victor's justice; Byers is simply attaching his
own value judgment to the form of victor's justice he agrees with. It is
beyond question that both Hussein and Milosevic committed
international crimes worthy of international condemnation, or at a
minimum, a public airing of the allegations. Whether or not the
prosecution is instigated by the victors in a conflict, it advances the
cause of international justice because it represents the hope that was
initiated in Nuremburg and Tokyo following World War II-that
perpetrators of such grievous crimes would not go unpunished,
regardless of their political position.
Following the publication of Byers' book, two important events
have occurred: Slobodan Milosevic died in prison prior to the
conclusion of his trial and Saddam Hussein was convicted, sentenced to
hang, and executed. The public airing of the allegations in both cases
served a useful purpose: to give voice to the victims and the quest for
justice. However, in both cases, the international lawyer is left cold. In
the example of Milosevic, his untimely death meant that no
determination could be made of the former leader's responsibility for
the deaths of tens of thousands of people. In the case of Hussein's
conviction, even Ramsay Clark, former U.S. Attorney General and
counsel to Hussein, pronounced that the trial was a sham. As the first
conviction of a former head of state, it will likely be of little assistance in
the advancement of international law due to its apparent questionable
legality. Thus, while it may have provided Hussein's victims with a
degree of satisfaction, it gives the world very little in terms of a valuable
example of international justice.
This book provides the layperson an excellent introduction to
the complexities and ongoing arguments alive in the realm of war law. It
2006]
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will educate even the uninitiated with a simple and well-argued
description of how law and politics interact in this forum. The topic of
humanitarian law is one that has interest beyond the circle of lawyers
and academics that study it. For making this complex area of law
accessible to any interested reader, this book is a welcome addition to
the body of literature on the topic of humanitarian law. Although this
book does not replace the standard texts commonly used by
international law practitioners and academics, it explains the importance
and realities of the political environment of the United Nations. For
those working in or studying international law, the book provides a good
basis for seeing how international law operates in a political context.
However, without a single footnote throughout, it can only provide a
general overview as well as a good basis to begin one's research. The
political undertones merely add colour and must be regarded as
commentary rather than as statements about the current status of
international law.
